Staff Reports
The Trump administration recently signed and sent to Congress a Section 123 civil nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia. The deal opens the door for long-term U.S. commercial nuclear projects in the kingdom. That’s big for American companies — and potentially big trouble for nuclear nonproliferation if Washington doesn’t use the leverage Congress already has.
What the 123 Agreement actually does
The Department of Energy says Secretary of Energy Chris Wright and Saudi Minister of Energy Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman signed the pact and that it creates a legal framework for U.S. industry to build and support civilian nuclear plants in Saudi Arabia. In plain English: American firms could build reactors, sell parts, and supply fuel services for decades. The administration pitches this as both an economic win and a way to keep Riyadh tied to U.S. standards and know‑how.
The alarming omission: no “gold standard,” no Additional Protocol
Here’s the rub. Reports show the agreement does not include the so‑called “gold standard” — a binding Saudi promise not to enrich uranium or reprocess spent fuel at home. It also reportedly leaves out the IAEA’s Additional Protocol, the tool that lets inspectors do surprise checks and really see what’s going on. That means the kingdom could, in theory, develop enrichment on its soil under a bilateral safeguards setup that won’t be as intrusive as the Additional Protocol. Nonproliferation experts like Andrea Stricker and Matthew Bunn warn that this weakens decades of U.S. policy and could change regional incentives in ways nobody should find comforting.
Congress must use its leverage — and conservatives should care
Under the law, Congress will review this 123 Agreement and can push for stronger terms. That is not a procedural nicety; it is the knife at Washington’s throat to secure real safeguards. Secretary of State Marco Rubio raised similar concerns in the past when working on Gulf nuclear talks. Republicans who care about American industry and American security need to insist on the gold standard or a real alternative that gives the IAEA reach. We can — and should — sell reactors and technology without handing a future nuclear breakout a nicer-looking signature and a better press release.
Bottom line: demand both commerce and safety
This deal is a mixed bag: a win for U.S. suppliers, a risk for nonproliferation if left unchecked. Conservatives should back American jobs and exports, but not at the price of hollowing out the rules that kept the Middle East from turning into a nuclear free‑for‑all. Congress: do your job. Insist on verifiable limits, demand the inspection tools that work, and don’t let strategic commerce become an excuse for strategic blindness. Selling reactors isn’t a trophy if it makes the region more dangerous — and no amount of “trust us” from officials should replace enforceable commitments.
