Staff Reports
President Donald Trump dropped a political grenade this week in Ankara. On the sidelines of the NATO summit he said his team would lift certain sanctions on Türkiye and that the administration would “consider” restoring Türkiye’s access to F‑35 jets. That comment lit up Washington fast — and not in a good way for the usual suspects who love to kneecap sensible deals with red tape and foreign-policy virtue signaling.
Trump signals F‑35 rethink in Ankara
On the record, the president used careful wording — “So it is something we definitely would consider” — but the signal was unmistakable. The White House is weighing lifting CAATSA sanctions and exploring a path to let Türkiye back into the F‑35 orbit. That move follows an earlier notification to Congress about a separate proposed $700 million sale of jet engines to Türkiye, which kicked off an expedited review window and gave lawmakers a procedural hook to try to stop any wider rollback.
Congressional firestorm and legal roadblocks
Congress reacted the way Congress always does when a president tries to cut a deal: loudly and with lots of paperwork. Representative Dina Titus moved quickly to introduce a Joint Resolution of Disapproval tied to the engine‑sale notification. That triggers the Arms Export Control Act review mechanics, where lawmakers can try to block transfers. More importantly, a statutory barrier remains: the FY2020 NDAA includes a provision often cited as blocking any F‑35 transfer to Türkiye while it still possesses Russian S‑400 air‑defense systems. You can say “we’ll consider” all you like, but law and politics are in the way.
Allied concerns and strategic tradeoffs
Israel, Greece, Cyprus and others have already raised alarms. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said putting the most advanced fighter in the hands of a leader who has been openly hostile to Israel would be reckless. Greek‑American and other lawmakers point to Türkiye’s recent posture in the eastern Mediterranean and its ties to Russia and Iran. On the other hand, Trump’s argument is familiar: better to have a strong Türkiye inside NATO than pissing it off and pushing it into deeper orbit with Moscow. That is realpolitik, plain and simple — and it has persuasive points. But the S‑400 problem is not imaginary. The Pentagon has warned about potential intelligence risks if Russian systems are co‑located with F‑35s.
So what happens next?
The path forward is straightforward in process but choppy in politics. The White House can propose a certification or a mitigation plan — for example, proof the S‑400s are removed or neutralized — or try to lift sanctions. Congress can use the AECA window, or pursue further legislation to block or limit transfers. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and the Pentagon will be pressed to explain how legal bars like Section 1245 would be handled. Expect loud lobbying from allies and a bipartisan bloc in Congress ready to make this fight costly for the administration if it moves without ironclad safeguards.
President Trump is playing to strengthen NATO’s southern flank and to reward a partner he sees as useful. That makes political sense in some circles. But talk of giving away the crown jewels of stealth technology without a rock‑solid fix to the S‑400 problem is tone‑deaf and dangerous. If Washington is going to rewrite this chapter, do it with transparency, tight conditions, and a plan that removes the real technical risk — not with a vague promise and a smile in Ankara. Congress should live up to its role and demand specifics before any transfer starts to look like a foreign‑policy favor at America’s expense.
